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From Taiwanisation to De-
sinification
Culture Construction in Taiwan since the 1990s
Bi-yu Chang
1 On February  2nd 2004,  less  than fifty  days  before  the  2004  presidential  election,  a
reader’s  letter  in  the  Lianhe  bao ( United  Daily  News)  complained  about  the  lack  of
cultural vision among the presidential candidates. The author examined the electoral
campaigns  of  the  two  major  parties:  the  Kuomintang  (KMT)  and  the  Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP), and could find no party position on cultural policy. “Where is
the future for Taiwan’s culture?”, he wrote, “Even rice wine and plastic bags have had a
policy, where is our cultural policy?”1
2 As a matter of fact, cultural policy has always played an important role in Taiwanese
politics. For example, the anti-communist principle and censorship were imposed in
the  1950s  as  a  means  to  control  cultural  expression;  the  Cultural  Renaissance
Movement (Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong) was launched in 1967 as a counterattack
response to  the Cultural  Revolution developing in  mainland China;  in  1977,  Chiang
Ching-kuo included culture in the Twelve National Construction Projects to respond to
social change; in 1995, Lee Teng-hui supported the Community Construction Movement
(shequ zongti yingzao), to further his political idea of the “community of shared fate”
(shengming gongtong ti)2.  Quite often, money was poured into projects, and measures
were  implemented,  yet  dissatisfaction  with  the  direction  that  culture-building  has
taken continues3. But what is at the source of this criticism? Most usually the confusion
arising from the question of how “culture” is to be defined, and expectations of what
“cultural policy” should be. 
A web of significance spun by the state
3 Many  have  taken  “cultural  policy”  as  something  straightforward  that  everybody
understands.  Generally  speaking,  the  term  is  used  to  denote  “arts  policy”,  or  is
described  as  referring  to  “a  policy  dealing  with  cultural  affairs”.4 Taking  the
anthropological point of view, “culture” encompasses almost everything. Whatever is
distinctive about the way of life of a group of people,  a community,  a society,  or a
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nation is culture. Therefore, to define cultural policy simply as arts policy seems overly
narrow. 
4 As the anthropologist  Geertz  has written,  “man is  an animal  suspended in webs of
significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it
to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in
search of meaning."5 To follow Geertz, cultural policy can be seen as the webs that the
state  tries  to  spin  in  order  to  create  such  meaning.  In  other  words,  any  official
statement, policy and deliberate action/inaction with the intent to produce such types
of  meaning  and formulate  identity  can  be  seen as  a  form of  “cultural  policy”,  the
official indicator of the state's cultural blueprint. Hence, a broadly-defined “cultural
policy”  is  not  limited  to  cultural  events,  arts  funding,  arts  education  or  cultural
schemes, but also includes language policy, education policy, cultural movements and
social policy that can create, as outcomes of such policy, cultural meaning6. 
5 I am not suggesting that top-down policies have a direct influence on the way in which
our sense of identity is constructed, or on the way we formulate our worldview. The
political dimensions of cultural policy are usually hidden and therefore unseen. Framed
within the Gramscian idea of “hegemony”7, cultural policy can be seen to be useful in
disseminating  and  popularising  a  hegemonic  discourse,  useful  in  its  turn  in
maintaining state power. Through regulating, funding, and encouraging selected art
forms and artists, for example, cultural policy can help the state to create a favoured
ideology,  reinforce  ruling-class-selected  values,  maintain  control,  increase  cultural
capital value, and thus ensure the success of this (cultural and political) “hegemony”.
Examination of such so-called cultural policies will reveal the kind of culture the state
intents to build, and also help us understand how certain social and cultural changes
came about. 
6 The year 2000 marked the beginning of a new political era in Taiwan. However, did the
course of national culture-building change accordingly? This article looks at how the
political parties have constructed Taiwanese culture and identity since the 1990s.
The beginning of Taiwanisation 
7 For fifty years the KMT kept a tight grip on cultural expression in Taiwan. The “anti-
communist literature and arts” (fangong wenyi) principle dominated the early post-war
years, followed by a forceful sinification policy―the “Cultural Renaissance Movement”8
in the 1960s. This hit local culture very hard. The use of local dialects was forbidden in
schools and public places9, Taiwanese traditional xiqu and folk arts were seen as crude
and backward, and Taiwanese history was almost entirely absent from textbooks10. In
other  words,  all  things  Chinese  were  associated  with  sophistication,  beauty  and
grandeur, while all things Taiwanese were regarded as vulgar, stupid and coarse. 
8 However, this sinification principle was severely shaken in the 1970s. There were many
reasons for this change:  the impact of  international isolation,  domestic demand for
political  reform,  the  end  of  the  Cultural  Revolution,  and  most  of  all,  a  cultural
awakening  in  Taiwan.  The  KMT  was  forced  to  adopt  a  more  localised  and  open
approach. In 1977, Chiang Ching-kuo decided to include culture as one of the “national
constructions”, and in 1981, set up the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA, wenhua jianshi
weiyuanhui) in charge of Taiwan’s cultural development. For the first time, indigenous
culture and heritage were promoted alongside Chinese culture, even though a China-
centric mentality still dominated the political scene. This changing course of cultural
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policy was not merely a political gesture, but a significant move shifting the cultural
emphasis gradually from traditional China to contemporary Taiwan11. 
9 In 1987, the lifting of martial law formally set off the process of indigenisation and
democratisation. The emphasis in cultural policy shifted from traditional Chinese to
contemporary  Taiwanese.  However,  it  was  the  rise  of  Lee  Teng-hui  that  had  the
greatest influence in reconstructing Taiwan's political culture. Since the early 1990s,
Lee started to openly promote Taiwanisation. For example, he reorganised the CCRC
into a new cultural apparatus—the National Cultural Association (NCA, Wenhua zonghui)
in 199112, and advocated a “community of shared fate” to encourage the development
of Taiwanese consciousness. He urged people in Taiwan, “For our future prosperity, we
rely  on  one  another.  We  are  both  Chinese  and  Taiwanese.  There  is  no  ethnic
difference... We should be able to have an equal footing and equal opportunities.”13 The
starting point was “community”14. 
10 In response, when the Ministry of Interior revised the Census Registration Law, the
zuji15 (WW, ancestral origin) entry was abolished, and replaced with a record of one's
“birthplace”. Since then, the records of “second-generation mainlanders” have been
officially  removed.  The  ancestral  differences  between  Taiwan-born  baby-boomers
became  blurred.  This  change  not  only  aimed  to  reduce  shengji16 conflicts,  but  also
demonstrated an official line defining the term “Taiwanese” to cut out unnecessary
division.
11 When the KMT mainstream (zhuliupai), led by Lee Teng-hui, won the factional struggle
in February 1993, the indigenisation trend finally gathered force and accelerated. Lee
announced  another  slogan  “Running  Big  Taiwan,  Establishing  the  New  Zhongyuan” 
(Jingying  da  Taiwan,  jianli  xin  zhongyuan),  in  1995,  shifting  Taiwan  to  the  “central”
position.  He  emphasised  that  his  future  state  policy  would  "reinforce  the  superior
status of Taiwan as the centre of new Zhongyuan"17. 
12 In  1995,  with  Lee’s  involvement  and  support,  the  CCA  launched  the  Community
Construction Movement.  It  was  designed by anthropologist  Chen Chi-nan18,  to  be  a
mechanism to build Taiwanese consciousness and a new identity. Its ultimate goal was
to  encourage  local  people  to  care  for  their  own  environment,  to  make  their  own
decisions, and to create community consciousness and a sense of belonging and pride.19
This  policy  has  extended  beyond  the  domain  of  arts  policy,  to  create  a  “cultural
vision”—construction of a “new homeland” (xin guxian)20. 
13 All of a sudden, an originally political claim of “being one’s own master and managing
one’s own affairs” (dangjia zuozhu) became a major concern in people’s daily lives. Even
with  its  shortcomings  and  the  difficulties  it  encountered  since  its  launch,  the
Community Construction Movement changed the infrastructure of Taiwanese society,
cementing  into  it  a  sense  of  community,  boosting  Taiwanese  awareness  and
constructing  Taiwan  as  the  “Homeland”.  Symbolically,  this  movement  was  the
beginning of the official gesture to sever connections with the Chinese-centric identity
that the KMT had promoted previously. 
14 This  increased  local  empowerment  enhanced  interest  in  Taiwanese  culture  and
involvement  in  community  affairs.  In  addition,  the  long-awaited  education  reform
began around the same time. Education in Taiwan has always been conservative and
slow to respond to social change, because it played a role as the final stronghold where
the  ruling  power  could  construct  ideologies  and  reproduce  its  values21.  The  KMT
started both the standardised textbook system and nine-year compulsory education in
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1968, in the attempt to control ideological construction. By imposing both systems at
the same time, Taiwan’s education after 1968 provided only one version of “the truth”,
and created a generation of Taiwanese who saw no other serious possible alternative to
the economic and cultural assemblage then in place22.
15 The call for liberalisation in education began in the early 1980s, but change came late.
It was not until 1996 that the standard textbook system was finally abolished in the
elementary schools, and 1999 in junior and senior high schools23. Since then, Taiwanese
teachers have finally been given the freedom to choose textbooks and have a say in
how their teaching is conducted.
16 Even though the  Ministry  of  Education  (MOE)  recognised  the  necessity  to  increase
indigenous content in textbooks, it was slow to act. For example, the MOE had rejected
several proposals to set up Taiwanese literature departments in universities. Soon after
Lee Teng-hui won the first Presidential election in 1996, the tide turned. 
17 In 1997, a new subject was added to the new junior high school curriculum: “Getting to
Know Taiwan” (renshi Taiwan).  However, it was attacked for being full of errors and
over-politicised. Some criticised the content as selective and partial, some condemned
the deliberate omission of Japanese colonial suppression, some identified an editorial
prejudice  against  aborigines  and  women,  and  some  suspected  an  attempt  at  de-
sinification  (qu  Zhongguo  hua)24.  In  spite  of  the  controversy,  the  new  subject  was
implemented. In the same year, the first Department of Taiwanese Literature was also
approved at the Aletheia University (then Tanshui Management College). Since then,
the MOE has not only approved the establishment of many Departments of Taiwanese
Literature25, but has also aggressively encouraged their development in order to cope
with the pressing need to supply teachers to teach Local Studies (xiangtu jiaoxue), a new
compulsory subject26. 
18 After being forced to take on an indigenised stand in the 1980s, the KMT carried out
Taiwanisation  more  aggressively  and  openly  under  Lee  Teng-hui’s  lead.
“Taiwanisation” was used by the KMT to gain support, renew its outdated image, and
maintain  cultural  hegemony.  Cultural  policy  in  the  1990s,  such  as  the  Community
Construction Movement, took up the role of promoting Taiwanese culture, fostering a
sense of Taiwanese awareness, and promoting a new set of values. 
19 The process of “Taiwanisation”, which began in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s,
altered the previously dominant China-centric identity, and created a new national-
popular consensus. As a result, rebuilding a long-ignored indigenous culture became a
common concern.  The discourse  of  Taiwanese  subjectivity  was  forming,  and a  new
Taiwanese identity was emerging. Within only a few years, people’s own perception of
their identity changed dramatically27. By the late 1990s, the trend of Taiwanisation was
accepted as politically correct.  In accordance with Gramsci’s  idea of  hegemony, the
political regime change was achieved by a change of cultural hegemony. In 2000, the
DPP  won  the  Presidential  election,  because  of  what  it  represented—a  Taiwanese
awareness  and  subjectivity  that  had  become increasingly  popular.  In  contrast,  this
change of culture, being partially promoted by the KMT, ironically led to the KMT’s
downfall. 
DPP culture construction 
20 Since  the  DPP  candidate  Chen  Shui-bian  won  the  Presidential  election  in  2000,
indigenisation has taken centre stage and become the DPP’s top priority.  An era of
Taiwanisation finally got into full swing. However, facing the competition and impact
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of  China  hosting  the  2008  International  Olympic  Games,  the  DPP  launched  the
Challenge  2008—National  Development  Plan  to  increase  Taiwan’s  international
competitiveness28. 
21 According to the Government Information Office (GIO)29, the “Challenge 2008” project is
built  around ten  programmes,  aiming  to  achieve  significant  political,  financial  and
fiscal reforms. Substantial investments will be made in areas to improve manpower,
R&D and innovation, logistics networks, and the living environment. 
22 According to the Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD)30, the aim of
the scheme was to turn Taiwan into a “Green Silicon Island” (lüse xidao)31, aspiring to
create a clean, high-tech and innovative island-state. 
23 However, the scheme was severely hit soon after its launch, firstly by the impact made
by September 11th incident on the world economy, and the uncertainty brought on by
the war in Iraq, and secondly by the heavy blow dealt by the SARS epidemic in 2003. In
order to boost the economy and renew the focus of Challenge 2008, less than two years
later,  the  Executive  Yuan  announced  Ten  New  Major  Construction  Projects  in
November 2003, expecting to invest NT$500 billion in five years32. It is fair to say that
Ten New Major Construction Projects are the cream of the Challenge 2008 project. This
is  an  attempt  designed  to  speed  up  the  process  of  Challenge  2008  and  ensure  its
completion33. 
24 According to the GIO, the vision and aims of the projects are to: “strengthen Taiwan’s
international competitiveness and ensure that Taiwan keeps its number one position in
Asia,  and  boost  the  drive  to  enter  the  global  top  three”  (qianghua  Taiwan  guoji
jingzhengli,  quebao  Yazhou  di  yi,  jinjun  shijie  san  qiang)34.  It  is  obvious  that  the  DPP
government is aiming high. Stripping away the policy cliché and nationalist sentiment
and ambition, the aim of the DPP was to make Taiwan ascend in the international arena
as a world-class economic powerhouse, and a high-tech hub.
25 In keeping with the goal of turning Taiwan into a Green Silicon Island, the cultural
emphases in these two national plans are placed on creativity, multicultural expression
and domestic tourism. The ten new major construction plans clearly set up the task of
building a Homeland in Taiwan, to construct a land of innovation and to preserve its
natural beauty. However, the hidden agenda here is not just about becoming one of the
global  top  three,  but  is  in  fact  aimed  at  transforming  Taiwan  into  a  competitive,
advanced, high-tech and culturally unique land, different in every way to China.
Three tendencies of the DPP culture construction
26 In comparing the cultural policy of the KMT and the DPP in the last two decades, it is
clear  that  the  former  is  more  conservative  and  constantly  struggling  with  its  old
nationalist  baggage,  while  the  latter  celebrates  Taiwanese-ness  wholeheartedly  and
tries to create a new spiritual homeland. On the whole, the emphases on community
construction  and  indigenisation  remain  unchanged  between  the  two  regimes.  That
said, the DPP cultural policy has three unique tendencies: an emphasis on the economic
value of culture industries, the theorisation of Taiwanese subjectivity, and branding
Taiwan as a cultural product.
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The Yinge pottery museum, Taipei county, opened in 2000
© Gilles Guiheux
Emphasis on economic values
27 Since the DPP came to power, it has forcefully advocated the economic value of the
cultural and creative industries. Instead of concentrating on high culture as the KMT
used  to  do,  the  DPP  has  shifted  its  focus  to  creative  industries  (including:  design,
tourism, popular music,  film, fashion and digital industries),  and stresses the added
values they can bring.  A new discourse has been created. By quoting the results of
UNESCO research and taking European countries (especially the UK) as examples, the
DPP  proclaims  that  “culture  is  good  business”,  emphasising  the  potential  for
employment and describing cultural industries as “sunrise/future-oriented industries”
35. 
28 As a matter of  fact,  this approach is  not new in Taiwan. In 1996,  the theme of the
Community  Construction  Movement  was  “industrialising  culture,  and  culturalising
industry” (wenhua chanye hua, chanye wenhua hua), encouraging the marriage between
local culture and industry (including agriculture, tourism, arts and crafts)36. However,
the focus then was mainly on consolidating local communities and creating a sense of
pride.  Since  2000,  this  has  shifted  to  boosting  domestic  tourism  and  stressing  the
economic benefits of culture. Consequently, instead of funding traditional categories in
the  arts,  holding  events,  or  promoting  community  construction,  the  DPP’s  cultural
focus was more drawn towards how to increase its economic value.
29 Then  CCA  Chairwoman  Tchen  Yu-chiou37 (2000-2004)  warned  that  the  Community
Construction Movement could not help Taiwan’s traditional agricultural society cope
with the impact of Taiwan entered the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Hence, a shift
from “community building” to “local industry development” was necessary38. 
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30 As a result, tourism becomes the major solution for combining local culture, natural
resources,  and  commercial  activities.  Cultural  tourism  appears  to  provide  all  the
answers:  updating  the  social  fabric  of  an  agricultural  society  and  transforming
traditional farming practices into service-oriented industries. Furthermore, it provides
the  Taiwanese  with  opportunities  to  explore  the  unknown  beauty  of  Taiwan,  to
consume cultural products and local delicacies,  and to allow expression of affection
towards one’s homeland. For the DPP government, cultural tourism is a win-win policy
—the Taiwanese learn to appreciate the long-ignored beauty of their homeland, and at
the  same  time,  their  consumption  also  benefits  local  economies  and  regenerates
depressed areas39.
31 According to Tchen Yu-chiou40, local culture should be the vehicle to improve tourism
and increase  employment  opportunities. Such development  would be,  she  believed,
mutually beneficial for both urban and rural lives, and helpful for the revival of the
local economy. Such remarks seem to suggest that the value of “culture” exists solely
on its capability to “earn money” and “make contributions to the economy”.
32 To help local industries modernise and transform into some form of cultural product,
the CCA launched a “Local Culture House (difang wenhua guan) Programme” in 2002.
This programme encouraged private investment in setting up local cultural houses for
performances  and  exhibitions.  Bringing  together  the  artists,  local  historians,  the
tourism industry, agricultural industry, and town planning staff, the programme had a
holistic approach. 
 
Before the 1970s little recognition was given to local arts and culture
© Imaginechina
33 In  the  ten  new  major  construction  plans,  most  cultural  investment  was  made  in
building art houses and culture centres41, and developing cultural tourism. However,
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the major emphasis of DPP cultural investment was placed on constructing buildings,
not culture; and on creative industries, not creativity.
34 Furthermore,  the  DPP  has  repeatedly  emphasised  two  issues:  “culture”  and
“environment” in its national construction plans, setting the target of Green Silicon
Island. The DPP government seems to be more concerned about environmental issues
and cultural development, and hence, a more sophisticated and visionary government
compared to the KMT with its constant emphasis on economic growth. 
35 The ideal of building a “green island” seems, according to the national construction
plans,  to  be  the  natural  outcome  of  the  industrial  transformation  of  upgrading
Taiwanese  industries  to  a  non-chimney  industrial  environment.  Inevitably,  tension
grows between the wish to “preserve culture and natural resources” and the need to
“develop the economy”. 
36 For example, the Water Resources Agency is considering building four artificial lakes
island-wide to control flooding and ensure water supplies. Environmental groups are
now protesting about the lack of environmental impact assessments. However, when
the Legislative  Yuan passed the Special  Statute  for  Increasing Investment in  Public
Construction on June 11th 2004, this plan was expected to be the first to be carried out42
despite environmentalists’ objections. It seems that when the economy is at stake, the
ideal  of  building  a  green  island  can  be  easily  sacrificed.  In  other  words,  the
environmental issue is, for the DPP, second to economic growth. 
Theorising Taiwan
37 Following Lee Teng-hui’s openly promoted Taiwanisation, the KMT government began
setting up research centres and museums43 to preserve Taiwanese culture and history,
yet without relinquishing its China-centric position44. KMT culture construction
seemed to be schizophrenic, being torn between public demands, the pressure from the
opposition and the reactionary strains within the party. It pursued indigenisation on
the one hand, while emphasising a China-centric ideology and Taiwan’s cultural links
with China on the other. 
38 When the DPP came to power in 2000,  a  discourse of  “Taiwanese subjectivity” had
already grown. Through cultural policy, the DPP government became directly involved
in the construction of  “what  Taiwanese culture  was”,  introducing a  Taiwan-centric
worldview,  restructuring  the  framework  for  the  transmission  of  knowledge  and
redefining the meaning of “Taiwanese-ness”. 
39 In addition to constructing a homeland in Taiwan through tourism, the promotion of
Taiwanese literature and the academic discipline of “Taiwan Studies” were crucial for
the building of a “spiritual homeland”. As Tchen Yu-chiou said, Taiwanese literature
symbolised “a spiritual national territory”, and the promotion of Taiwanese literature
indicated a return of power to Taiwanese people to have their say about their own
identity and “national narrative”45. 
40 Furthermore, an effort to digitise Taiwan’s historical archives has laid the foundations
of “Taiwan Studies”, and also ensured ready accessibility. The scale of these digitisation
projects is astonishing. More than sixty digital archives projects have been initiated
and are under construction46, and several virtual research centres also created47. Digital
archives  and  databases  not  only  provided  valuable  online  resources  for  academic
research, but also offered convenient teaching materials for “Local Studies” in schools.
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41 In  order  to  encourage  the  development  of  Taiwan  Studies  as  an  acknowledged
academic discipline, the funding given to academic research on Taiwan-related topics
has  risen  dramatically.  Furthermore,  a  large  portion  of  foreign  aid  would  also  be
diverted to scholarships for foreign students to study in Taiwan48. As DPP Premier Yu
Shyi-kun  suggested,  such  scholarships  would  provide  many  benefits,  especially
diplomatic ones. Yu predicted, Taiwan would be “forging an important link in the chain
of Taiwan’s long-term relations with foreign countries and serving to expand Taiwan’s
national power”49.
42 Domestically,  the  construction  of  a  brand  new  spiritual  national  territory  through
education was also under way. Education could be very effective in constructing “a
regime of truth” and a new identity. In 2001, a brand new education system, the Nine
Grade  Curriculum  Alignment  for  Elementary  and  Junior  High  Education50,  was
launched, integrating the curriculum of elementary and junior-high schools. 
43 “Getting to Know Taiwan” was removed from the new curriculum. Instead, the content
covering  Taiwan has  been  distributed  across  a  range  of  subjects51.  In  other  words,
“Taiwan” has become the dominant theme of the new curriculum. Furthermore, the
subject “Native Languages” (xiangtu yuyan)52 has been made compulsory in elementary
schools from the third year upwards for one to two hours per week. It will only become
optional when students reach junior high school level.  
44 To  link  up  with  the  Nine  Grade  Curriculum  Alignment  system,  a  new  high  school
curriculum  was  also  announced.  The  MOE  claimed  that  this  new  curriculum
endeavoured to remove politicised content and avoid ideological baggage. However,
the  new  history  curriculum  was  severely criticised  specifically  for  being  over-
politicised. 
45 The disputes focused mainly on how the curriculum was structured, how history was
taught, and what was taught. The new high school history curriculum proposed to draw
a historical line in 150053. The first year concentrates on domestic history, including
Taiwanese history (prehistory to contemporary Taiwan) in the first term, and Ancient
Chinese history (prehistory to the early Ming dynasty) in the second term. The theme
of the second year is modern world history. Chinese history since 1500 including the
latter part of the Ming dynasty, the entire Qing dynasty and the early history of the
Republic of China (until 1949), was classified as part of contemporary world history.
46 The  editorial  guidelines  for  high  school  history  textbooks—the  “concentric  circle”
(tongxintuan)  theory,  proposed  by  historiographer  Tu  Cheng-sheng—were  the  same
principles used for compiling “Getting to Know Taiwan”. Tu interpreted this concept as
“having its base on Taiwan, concerning China, and having a foot in the international
arena”  (lizu  Taiwan,  guanhuai  Zhongguo,  jinru  shijie).  This  principle  emphasised
Taiwanese subjectivity,  positioning Taiwan at  the centre in order to understand its
surrounding world and to interpret history. Tu claimed that the starting point of this
view is “prioritising Taiwan”54. 
47 Structuring history in such a way, the new curriculum was criticised for disseminating
the idea of Taiwanese independence, and creating an ideological basis for a political
goal: “one side one state” (yi bian yi guo)55. Dividing history at 1500 was condemned as a
scheming way of cutting off the cultural umbilical cord with China, and constructing an
independent historical subjectivity—“post-Ming Taiwan”56. Tu rejected speculation that
his theory acted as a vehicle for de-sinification57. However, the debate continues and
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the new history curriculum is  still  in the process of  consultation and modification.
When Tu Cheng-sheng was appointed Minister of Education in May 2004, he announced
that the new curriculum would be implemented as planned from the 2006 academic
year58. 
48 By  building  up  a  “spiritual  national  territory”,  encouraging  Taiwan  Studies  and
disseminating a  Taiwan-central  worldview,  the  DPP is  reclaiming Taiwan’s  national
territory.  Alongside  constitutional  reform  in  the  political  sphere,  the  concept  of
“national territory” is also under reconstruction. The DPP’s approach is “remapping
Taiwan”.  Two  series  of  maps  of  Taiwan  were  launched  in  2003,  and  successfully
challenged  the  conventional  way  of  seeing  Taiwan.  The  two  series  were:  “Viewing
Taiwan  from  Different  Angles:  Maps  of  Taiwanese  Perspectives”,  and  “Taiwan  in
Foreign Eyes: Maps of International Perspective”. 
49 The first series consisted of seven new maps, presenting unconventional approaches to
mapping Taiwan’s ethnic, oceanic, linguistic and cultural dimensions, and entitled: Our
Eastern Asian Neighbours, Coming From Batan, From Tangshan to Taiwan, Taiwan’s
Assertion, My Austronesian Friends, Global Neighbours, Looking at Taiwan from the
Seabed. 
50 The second series consisted of 32 old maps selected from historical archives. They were
chosen to demonstrate how Taiwan was viewed through foreign eyes over the past four
hundred  years,  and  to  show  Taiwan’s  maritime  connections  with  the  Dutch,  the
Spanish, the British and the Japanese. 
51 As the  CCA asserts,  “Map...  reflects  the  drawers’  viewpoint  and interpretation of  a
place,  and  hence,  is  a  symbol  of  power...  Through  these  [new]  maps,  Taiwanese
subjectivity...  is clearly shown, providing opportunities for Taiwanese to understand
their homeland and plan for the future”59.  These two series demonstrated Taiwan’s
international position, showing links with its Asian neighbours and connections with
the world since the sixteenth century.  The significance of  these maps showed that
Taiwan’s relationship with China is only a small part of Taiwan’s past. 
52 Thus it appears that the DPP government has tried to release Taiwan from the previous
discourse of “Taiwan being part of China”. Mapping Taiwan is another way of asserting
Taiwanese subjectivity and articulating a national narrative. In other words, the CCA’s
attempt to re-map Taiwan is a redefinition of Taiwan’s “national territory”. 
53 Furthermore, the DPP has, since coming to power, taken many measures to express a
more  Taiwan-centric  position  with  the  intention  of  creating  cultural  meaning  and
changing people’s values. For example, wording in the new passport has changed60; the
issuing bank and the design of new banknotes were changed61; the discourse about the
origin of Taiwanese aborigines has been reconstructed62; a plan to relocate capital from
Taipei to Kaohsiung was aired63; national holidays are frequently changed64. All these
contributed to reframing a new national narrative, generating an independent identity,
creating a different worldview, and fading out the shadow of Chinese influence.
Branding Taiwan
54 Believing  that  culture  is  economically  beneficial,  the  CCA  joined  forces  with  the
Industrial  Development  Bureau  (Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs)  to  encourage  the
development  of  creative  industries,  funding  modern  designs  to  present  Taiwanese
culture. In a speech about future CCA policy, then chairwoman Tchen Yu-chiou openly
asserted  that  “using  branding  techniques  to  build  and  introduce  an  image  of
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contemporary Taiwan to the world, cultural and creative industries will be the most
important force.”65 
55 The CCA took the initiative to  organise  competitions and give funding,  in  order to
encourage the growth of  creative industries,  and establish a unique and innovative
brand name for Taiwanese products. For example, the “2003 Taiwanese Fashion Party”
encouraged Taiwanese  designers  to  introduce  indigenous  culture  into  their  fashion
designs and to use local textiles. According to the Taiwan Journal,  an official journal
published by the GIO in English, this scheme aimed to create a Taiwanese “national
costume … [that] reflects its cultural essence and acts as a touchstone to its national
identity”66. 
56 The “Searching for Taiwan Red” (xunzhao Taiwan hong) project was another example of
using  culture  to  “brand  Taiwan”.  The  scheme  was  set  up  to  find  a  colour  that
represented Taiwan's cultural image in the international society, giving a “uniformed”
corporate look, and increased commercial opportunities for Taiwan's cultural products
and industries. As Tchen Yu-chiou explained at the launch of Taiwan Red, “Turkey has
its turquoise, Taiwan should also have its own colour”67.  A shade of dusty pink was
chosen, because of its association with traditional culture, festivals and celebrations. It
was said that Taiwan Red was like the red of the red rice cake (hongguike). This colour,
according to Tchen, represents “the joy of Taiwan”, showing a country with a positive,
modern and joyful image, shaking off the sad and bleak old past68. 
57 When the exhibition “The Earth From Above” by French photographer Yann Arthus-
Bertrand was shown in Taiwan, the CCA negotiated a deal with his workshop to include
Taiwan in his next project Visages et Paysages. Then CCA chairwoman Tchen Yu-chiou
has  high hopes  for  this  project  and hopes  this  opportunity  will  “let  the  world  see
Taiwan and get to understand us better"69. 
58 Indeed,  “let  the world see Taiwan” is  the ultimate goal  for “branding Taiwan”.  For
example, the CCA has aggressively promoted 12 potential sites to be accepted by the
UNESCO as a World Heritage site70, with the same purpose—let the world see Taiwan71.
Similarly,  the  plans  to  hold  the  Taiwan  Exposition  in  2008,  the  Taiwanese  Arts
Exposition in 2005, and the 2009 World Games share the aim of showing off Taiwan’s
economic achievement, creativity and cultural development. 
59 The  desire  to  “make  ourselves  known”  has  been  deeply  embedded  among  the
Taiwanese since the 1970s diplomatic defeats. As Taylor72 rightly says, the recognition
of the “significant others” is crucial for the formation of identity. To gain recognition,
it is crucial to create dialogical relations with others73. Over the years, although formal
diplomatic  relations were developed through much hard work,  Taiwan has tried to
participate  actively  in  international  organisations  and  has  endeavoured  to  build
informal diplomatic relations. In order to break through the PRC diplomatic blockade
and avoid direct conflict, “culture” has always been the “dialogue” that creates and
articulates an “ideal identity” to the significant others. 
60 A new “brand association” of Taiwan is under construction, using marketing strategy,
invented tradition and innovative ideas. It is an interesting tactic taking cultural policy
as a marketing tool to brand a country. In other words, despite the seemingly apparent
emphasis  on indigenisation and building a  homeland,  deep down,  the  DPP cultural
policy is motivated by a desire to promote Taiwan in international society as a new
cultural state. Instead of promoting Taiwanese artists performing “traditional Chinese
arts” on the international stage, as the KMT did, the DPP has strived to find new ways
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of “narrating” Taiwan. Among all cultural influences in Taiwan, aboriginal culture was
identified as the best asset in creating a non-Chinese image and to “sell” Taiwan74.
61 Since 2000, the DPP has carried out culture construction on a grand scale. As described
above, the DPP has worked to build a discourse of Taiwanese subjectivity by reaching
out at every possible level, from school to community, from commercial behaviour to
academic activities.
62 In  the  past,  the  KMT  used  cultural  exchange  as  a  means  to  expand  diplomatic
relationships.  The  DPP  has  taken  this  further.  Taiwan  is  presented  as  a  cultural
product,  placed on the international market by the creation of brand names, logos,
positioning, brand associations, and brand personality. Taiwan is marketed by the DPP
as a place of rich natural beauty and cultural heritage, it has a distinct colour, a highly
developed computer  industry,  and is  filled  with  theatres  of  international  standard.
Branding Taiwan articulates an ideal identity and a new version of a national narrative
to significant players internationally. By going global, the DPP aims to renew Taiwan’s
international image, and cut cultural ties with China.
63 Since the 1990s, the similarities between the cultural policies of the two parties are
striking.  Both  the  DPP  and  the  KMT  have  promised  to  develop  culture,  promote
community  construction,  encourage  multi-cultural  development,  and  preserve
heritage.  They have both advocated the establishment of  a  Ministry of  Culture and
Tourism75.  However,  the  DPP  has  been  more  creative  and  forceful.  The  major
differences between the two parties are mainly their priorities. 
64 The KMT had used Taiwanisation to hold on to its political power and had managed to
maintain its cultural hegemony for almost two decades. Although preserving Chinese
culture was not as important as developing Taiwanese culture by the end of the 1990s,
the KMT government had never given up the cultural link with China. In contrast, the
aim of  DPP Taiwanisation was  de-sinification.  It  emphasised the  unique mixture  of
Taiwan’s hybrid culture, and embraced the discourse of Taiwanese subjectivity76. 
65 In 2004, Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election, and the ideological dominance of
the  DPP  has  been  confirmed  and  secured.  Taiwanisation  has  formally  become  a
national-popular consensus. After Chen’s victory, there have been several interesting
cabinet appointments. Anthropologist Chen Chi-nan, the architect of the Community
Construction  Movement,  was  appointed  as  CCA  chairman  in  charge  of  culture
construction. His appointment shows the DPP’s continued emphasis on building a new
homeland.  Historiographer  Tu  Cheng-sheng  was  appointed  Education  Minister.  His
appointment indicates a further de-sinification of knowledge transmission; Tchen Yu-
chiou, former CCA chairwoman and a DPP veteran, was appointed as a National Policy
Consultant in the Presidential Office and a cultural ambassador. Because of her past
performance in marketing Taiwan, her appointment also represents a more aggressive
approach to branding Taiwan. 
66 The  new  cabinet  arrangements  confirm  the  DPP’s  culture  construction  strategy—
building  Taiwan’s  brand name internationally,  constructing  a  contemporary  hybrid
culture in Taiwan, and theorising and transmitting a DPP-versioned national narrative. 
67 Even if the KMT had won the 2004 election, according to their White Paper for Culture,
their emphasis on Taiwanisation would have definitely continued, promoting digital
industry, sport and leisure activities. In contrast, the DPP continues its focus on the
construction of community culture, and endeavours to sever Chinese influence. As a
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young and emerging state, or at least a de facto political entity, the DPP government has
strived to present Taiwan as an island state in its own right, rather than being taken as
a Chinese off-shore island, or a reference point to China. The aim is simple: to reduce
the Chinese claim on Taiwanese culture and political ownership.
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What triggered the change in Taiwanese identity in the 1990s? How has a sense of Taiwanese-
ness been constructed since then? How does the state formulate Taiwanese culture and create
meaning within that culture? This article looks at how Taiwan’s ruling parties have constructed
Taiwanese culture and identity since the lifting of martial law. It compares the continuity and
differences in cultural policies between two political regimes—the KMT’s apparent emphasis on
indigenisation  and  the  DPP’s  push  for  de-sinification—focusing  mainly  on  the  policy  of
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